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Is the observed large increase in consumer indebtedness since 1970 benecial for U.S.
consumers? This paper quantitatively investigates the macroeconomic and welfare implica-
tions of relaxing borrowing constraints using a model with preferences featuring temptation
and self-control. The model can capture two contrasting views: the positive view, which
links increased indebtedness to nancial innovation and thus better consumption smooth-
ing, and the negative view, which is associated with consumers' over-borrowing. I nd
that the latter is sizable: the calibrated model implies a social welfare loss equivalent to
a 0.4 percent decrease in per-period consumption from the relaxed borrowing constraint
consistent with the observed increase in indebtedness. The welfare implication is strikingly
dierent from the standard model without temptation, which implies a welfare gain of 0.7
percent, even though the two models are observationally similar. Naturally, the optimal
level of the borrowing limit is signicantly tighter according to the temptation model, as a
tighter borrowing limit helps consumers by preventing over-borrowing.
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Figure 1: Total unsecured consumer debt over GDP
1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, there has been a substantial increase in the indebtedness of U.S. consumers,
although that trend might reverse as a result of the recent downturn. Total household debt in
the U.S. increased from 43 percent of GDP in 1982 to 62 percent in 2000.1 Both unsecured and
secured debt increased. Figure 1 shows the trend of unsecured consumer debt relative to GDP.2
It was close to zero before 1970 but has gradually increased since then, and it has stabilized
around 7 percent since 2000. While an increase in indebtedness is often seen as a result of
an innovation in the nancial sector and thus is linked to a gain in social welfare, there are
two channels through which rising indebtedness is associated with a welfare loss. First is the
general equilibrium eect; increased indebtedness might induce under-saving, which slows down
capital accumulation. Second, there is a popular perception that consumers might be over-
borrowing and over-consuming. While the rst channel is studied, among others, by Campbell
and Hercowitz (2009) and Obiols-Homs (2011), the second channel has not been studied, since it
cannot be systematically captured by models with the standard exponential preferences.3 This
paper intends to ll the void.
In order to analyze over-borrowing and over-consuming, I introduce preferences featuring
temptation and self-control, which is developed by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004a,b). Specif-
ically, I use a version of the macroeconomic model with the temptation preferences, which is
developed by Krusell et al. (2010). There are three benets of using the framework for a macroe-
1 Smith (2009).
2 Unsecured consumer debt is measured as the revolving consumer credit in the G.19 series of the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB). In the FRB data, total consumer credit consists of non-revolving and revolving credit. Revolving
credit mainly consists of loans for automobiles, mobile homes, and boats but also includes some unsecured
credit. Livshits et al. (2010) constructed an unsecured consumer credit data series that includes not only
revolving credit but also a part of non-revolving credit. However, the dierence between the revolving credit
and the unsecured consumer credit they constructed is small (less than one percentage point as a percentage
of disposable income) for the period for which more reliable data are available (after 1989).
3 Both Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) and Obiols-Homs (2011) investigate a cross-section of the welfare conse-
quences associated with rising debt in the U.S., but both use the standard exponential discounting preferences.
2conomic analysis of over-borrowing. First, in the temptation model, consumers are tempted to
borrow and consume more than they would choose if they could exert self-control. As a result,
they and suer from over-borrowing. Therefore, this framework is naturally suitable in studying
over-borrowing in response to a relaxed borrowing constraint. Second, the temptation model
developed by Krusell et al. (2010) includes the model with hyperbolic discounting consumers,
which is originally developed by Strotz (1956) and introduced into the standard macroeconomic
framework by Laibson (1997), as a special case.4 5 As I employ this special case for the analysis,
existing ndings associated with the hyperbolic discounting model are valid with the tempta-
tion model used in this paper. Finally, not only is the temptation model more general than
the hyperbolic discounting model, the temptation model enables more straightforward welfare
analysis; the hyperbolic discounting model is time-inconsistent, in which a consumer consists of
\multiple selves" as they have dierent preferences in each point of time. In this model, how to
put weights to these multiple self is not a trivial problem. On the other hand, the temptation
model is time-consistent and does not suer such problem.
There are supporting evidences { based on both survey results and estimated structural mod-
els { that consumers face temptation and self-control problem, which supports the use of the
temptation model for the analysis. At the same time, literature also found that models with and
without temptation are observationally similar in macroeconomic aggregates. Most importantly,
Angeletos et al. (2001) compare the macroeconomic implications of models with and without
temptation and argue that the temptation model replicates various dimensions of consumption
and savings behavior better than the standard model without temptation, although both models
are observationally similar in terms of the average life-cycle prole of aggregate saving.6 Further-
more, Barro (1999) shows the observational equivalence between the neoclassical growth models
with and without temptation. My ndings echo theirs: models with and without temptation
have similar macroeconomic implications. But how about welfare implications? This is the key
issue investigated in this paper.
Although the model with temptation potentially has welfare implications that are very dier-
ent from those in the standard model without temptation, not many papers study the welfare
implications of the macroeconomic model with temptation. There are few exceptions. Krusell
et al. (2010) show that a savings subsidy (or negative capital income tax) is optimal in the
4 The actual discount factor function used in the \hyperbolic discounting" models is not precisely hyperbolic, but
it is called by that name because originally a hyperbolic function was used. Quasi-hyperbolic or quasi-geometric
discounting is a more precise description of the actual discount factor function typically used in the literature,
although I use the terminology hyperbolic discounting since it is commonly used.
5 Angeletos et al. (2001) provide a good summary of the literature. Strotz (1956) rst formalized the hyper-
bolic discounting preferences. Phelps and Pollak (1968) use the quasi-hyperbolic discounting function in the
context of intergenerational time preferences. Laibson (1997) studies the role of an illiquid asset like housing
as commitment device for time-inconsistent consumers. Laibson et al. (2003) use a hyperbolic discounting
model to explain the credit card puzzle. Laibson et al. (2007) use a simulated method of moments to jointly
estimate key parameters associated with the hyperbolic discounting model. _ Imrohoro glu et al. (2003) study the
macroeconomic and welfare eects of having an unfunded Social Security program in the model with hyperbolic
discounting consumers. Tobacman (2009) investigates the wealth distribution of such a model.
6 While both Angeletos et al. (2001) and Barro (1999) conduct their analysis based on the hyperbolic discounting
model, the hyperbolic discounting model is a special case of the temptation model used in this paper. Therefore,
their ndings are applicable for the temptation model used in this paper.
3neoclassical growth model with temptation, while it is optimal not to tax capital income in the
model without temptation. _ Imrohoro glu et al. (2003) study welfare implications of social security
reforms. Malin (2008) studies mandatory savings oors.
The model developed in this paper is built on a life-cycle general equilibrium model with
incomplete markets initially developed by Huggett (1996) and Aiyagari (1994). This paper
introduces preferences featuring temptation and self-control into the standard general equilibrium
model with market incompleteness. The model is closest to the one in _ Imrohoro glu et al. (2003),
but they do not focus on intra-generational heterogeneity. In addition, this paper is the rst
one to solve for the equilibrium transition dynamics between steady states in a model with
temptation.
There are three main ndings. First, not only are the models with and without temptation
observationally similar in the steady-state equilibrium, as shown in Angeletos et al. (2001), the
aggregate response associated with an increased indebtedness, which is induced by a relaxed
borrowing limit, is both qualitatively and quantitatively similar between the two models. Sec-
ond, however, the two models have strikingly dierent welfare implications. According to the
calibrated model, while a relaxed borrowing limit is associated with a social welfare gain equiva-
lent to 0.7 percent of ow consumption in the model without temptation, the temptation model
implies a welfare loss of 0.4 percent. The dierence is due to the over-borrowing by consumers in
response to a relaxed borrowing limit. The problem is serious from a policy perspective because
the models with and without temptation are hard to distinguish but have contrasting welfare
implications. Barro (1999) argues that we can largely keep relying on the neoclassical growth
model with exponential discounting consumers as the workhorse framework, even though there
is some evidence in favor of temptation, because the growth models with the two dierent prefer-
ence specications are observationally equivalent. The case I study in this paper shows that one
needs to be careful even if the temptation model is observationally similar to the standard model
without temptation, because the two models could have very dierent welfare implications. Fi-
nally, the optimal level of the borrowing limit is lower, at about 7 percent of average income,
in the model with temptation compared with the standard model without temptation, whose
optimal borrowing limit is about 19 percent. Even in a standard no-temptation model like those
in Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) and Obiols-Homs (2011), there is a level of the borrowing
limit at which the gain from a relaxed borrowing limit (better consumption smoothing) is dom-
inated by the negative general equilibrium eect (capital decumulation). The reason why the
optimal borrowing limit is substantially lower in the model with temptation is over-borrowing.
When consumers exhibit temptation preferences, there is a potential for extra welfare gain from
restricting borrowing of consumers.
Although the model used for analysis is rich in features, there are limitations. First, the
model abstracts from aggregate shocks. Second, I assume that all consumers have the same
preferences. For example, in the temptation models, all consumers share the same parameter
values associated with temptation. Third, I do not allow any commitment device for consumers.
As Laibson (1997) showed, consumers with temptation would optimally try to use commitment
devices, if available, to restrain themselves from over-consuming in the future. Examples are
durable goods (such as housing) or retirement saving instruments (such as individual retirement
4accounts (IRAs)).7 Finally, I consider only unsecured debt. I leave these issues for future
research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. At the end of the
section, I will argue that the model with the Strotz-Laibson hyperbolic discounting preferences
is a special case of the temptation model developed by Krusell et al. (2010) and employed in
this paper. Section 3 describes how the model is calibrated for quantitative exercises. Section 4
gives an overview of the computational algorithm with which the model is solved. Section 5
presents the main results of the paper, using steady-state analysis. Section 6 conducts an analysis
explicitly taking into account the equilibrium transition path from an initial steady state to a
new one. Section 7 addresses the sensitivity of the main results. Section 8 concludes. The
separate Supplementary Appendix includes more details of the calibration and the computational
algorithm.
2 Model
The model is based on the general equilibrium life-cycle model of Huggett (1996), with the version
of the Gul-Pesendorfer preferences featuring temptation and self-control that is developed by
Krusell et al. (2010). After completing the description of the model, in Section 2.9, I will provide
an alternative formulation of the consumer's problem based on the Strotz-Laibson hyperbolic
discounting preferences, and argue that, when the strength of temptation is taken to innity, the
two formulations generate identical optimal decision rules. Therefore, all existing macroeconomic
implications under the Strotz-Laibson hyperbolic discounting preferences are valid under the
temptation preferences. The reason I use the temptation preferences is that the temptation
preferences allow straightforward welfare analysis compared with the hyperbolic discounting
preferences, which features multiple-selves within a consumer.
2.1 Demographics
Time is discrete and starts from 0. In each period, the economy is populated by I overlapping
generations of consumers. In period t, a measure (1+)t of consumers are born.  is the constant
population growth rate. Each generation is populated by a mass of consumers. Consumers are
born at age 1 and could live up to age I. An age-i consumer survives to age-i+1 with probability
si. With probability (1   si), the consumer dies. I is the maximum possible age, which implies
sI = 0. Consumers retire at a xed age IR < I. Consumers with age i < IR are called workers,
and those with age i  IR are called retirees.
2.2 Preferences
The preferences of consumers are time separable and characterized by an instantaneous utility
function, two discount factors,  and , and another parameter . The instantaneous utility
7 Although it is likely that if such commitment devices are available, consumers in the model will use them more
extensively if the borrowing constraint is relaxed, notice that I calibrate the borrowing constraint to match
the observed level of indebtedness. If these commitment devices are available for consumers in the model, the
degree of relaxation of the borrowing constraint must be calibrated to be even larger. Therefore, introducing
commitment devices that allow consumers to restrain themselves from over-consuming and over-borrowing will
not necessarily weaken the main results of the paper. Exactly how the main results of the paper will be aected
by the introduction of the commitment devices is left for future research.
5function u(c) is standard: it is strictly increasing and strictly concave in c. Consumers do not
value leisure; there is no labor supply decision. In Section 7, I relax the assumption and introduce
a labor-leisure decision as a sensitivity analysis.
 and  are called self-control discount factor and temptation discount factor, respectively. 
represents strength of temptation.  is the only discount factor if the consumer can exert perfect
self-control and thus is not aected by temptation. In other words, in a special case where the
temptation is nonexistent (strength of temptation  is zero), the model with temptation and
self-control preferences reverts to a standard exponential discounting model with  as the only
discount factor.  < 1 is the additional discount factor that a consumer is tempted to discount
future utility when making consumption-savings decision. Formal formulation of the consumers'
problem is presented in Section 2.7.
2.3 Technology
There is a representative rm that has access to the constant returns to scale production tech-
nology in the form of Y = ZF(K;L). Y is output, Z is the level of total factor productivity, K
is capital stock, and L is labor supply. Capital depreciates at a constant rate  per period.
2.4 Endowment
Consumers are born with zero assets. Each consumer is endowed with one unit of time each
period. Time is inelastically supplied for work, since leisure is not valued. Labor productivity of
a consumer is characterized by e(i;p), where i captures the life-cycle prole of labor productivity,
and p is the idiosyncratic shock to labor productivity. p is assumed to have nite support:
p 2 fp1;p2;:::;pNg. Each newborn consumer draws its initial p from an i.i.d. distribution where
0
p is the probability attached to each p. After the initial p is drawn, p follows a rst-order
Markov process with p;p0 as the transition probability from p to p0.
2.5 Market Arrangements
Capital and labor are traded competitively. Consumers are not allowed to trade state-contingent
securities but can borrow or save using asset a, subject to a borrowing limit at.
2.6 Government
The government has three roles in the model: (i) running the Social Security program, (ii)
collecting a proportional income tax, and (iii) collecting accidental bequests using estate taxes
and redistributing the proceeds with a lump-sum transfer.
The government runs a simple pay-as-you-go Social Security program. The government im-
poses a at payroll tax with the tax rate of S on all workers and uses the proceeds to nance
the Social Security benets bt;i of current retirees. It is assumed that all retirees receive the
same amount (bt) of benets regardless of their age or contribution, and the government budget
associated with the Social Security program balances each period. Formally, bt;i = 0 for i < IR
and bt;i = bt for i  IR.
The government collects a proportional general income tax with tax rate I. Both capital
and labor income are taxed at the same rate. The proceeds are not redistributed or valued by
consumers.
Because of the stochastic death, there are accidental bequests in the model. I assume that
6the government collects all of the accidental bequests using estate taxes and redistributes the
proceeds equally to the surviving consumers every period. dt denotes the lump-sum transfer
under the program in period t.
2.7 Consumer's Problem
The problem of an age-i consumer with the current productivity shock p and asset position a in






























0 = (a + dt)(1 + rt(1   I)) + e(i;p)(1   I   S)wt + bt;i (4)
Equation (1) is the Bellman equation. Equations (2) and (3) dene self-control utility and
temptation utility, respectively. The only dierence between the two is, while future utility is
discounted by  in the former, it is discounted by  in the latter. Naturally, when  < 1,
the consumer is tempted to consumer more this period when the consumer is maximizing the
temptation utility rather than self-control utility. Equation (4) is the standard budget constraint,
with consumption (c) and next-period assets (a0) on the left-hand side, and current-period assets
(a), transfers (dt), after-tax interest income ((a+dt)rt(1 I)), after-tax labor income (e(i;p)(1 
I   S)wt), and Social Security benets (bt;i) on the right-hand side. The maximand of the
Bellman equation consists of two parts { the self-control utility, and the part that contains the
temptation utility.  determines the relative strength of the latter. a0 = ga
t(i;p;a) is the optimal
decision rule associated with the Bellman equation above.
In order to understand the non-standard Bellman equation, let's consider the two extreme
cases rst. In an extreme case where  = 0, the temptation part of the problem drops out
completely, and the consumer's problem reverts back to the one with the standard exponential
discounting preferences with the discount factor . This is interpreted as the case when the con-
sumer has a perfect self-control and thus is not aected by temptation to consume more today
rather than in the future. In the other extreme case where  ! 1, the utility-maximizing con-
sumer wants to choose a0 that maximizes the temptation utility, as the relative importance of the
self-control utility becomes zero. Notice, however, that since the dierence between Wt(i;p;a;a0)
and maxe a0at Wt(i;p;a;e a0) becomes zero, the value updated in the Bellman equation is based
on the self-control utility, but with a0 that maximizes the temptation utility. The intuition is,
although the consumer wants to choose a0 to maximize the self-control utility, the consumer
succumbs to the temptation and chooses a0 that maximizes the temptation utility. In an inter-
mediate case where  2 (0;1), the consumer chooses a0 to balance the two forces; on the one
hand, the consumer wants to choose a0 that maximizes the self-control utility, which is associated
7with the discount factor . On the other hand, the consumer also wants to consume more, to
maximize the temptation utility with discount factor .  determines the relative strength of
the latter.
2.8 Equilibrium
I will rst dene the recursive competitive equilibrium where the demographic structure is sta-
tionary, even though the size of the population is growing at a constant rate . Then I will move
on to dene the steady-state recursive competitive equilibrium, where prices frt;wtg1
t=0 and gov-
ernment policy variables fbt;i;dtg1
t=0 are constant over time, although the aggregate variables are
growing at the population growth rate.
Let M be the space of an individual state, i.e., (i;p;a) 2 M. Let M be the Borel -algebra
generated by M, and  the probability measure dened over M. I will use a probability space
(M;M;) to represent a type distribution of consumers.
Denition 1 (Recursive competitive equilibrium) Given a sequence of total factor pro-
ductivity fZtg1
t=0, a sequence of borrowing limits fatg1
t=0, and the initial type distribution of
consumers 0, a recursive competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices frt;wtg1
t=0, government
policy variables fbt;i;dtg1
t=0, aggregate capital stock and labor supply fKt;Ltg1
t=0, value functions
fVt(i;p;a)g1
t=0, optimal decision rules fga
t(i;p;a)g1
t=0, and the measure after normalization with
respect to population growth, ftg1
t=0, such that:
1. In each period t, given the prices and policy variables, Vt(i;p;a) is a solution to the con-
sumer's optimization problem dened in Section 2.7, and ga
t(i;p;a) is the associated optimal
decision rule.
2. The prices frt;wtg1
t=0 are determined competitively, i.e.,
rt = ZtFK(Kt;Lt)    (5)














3. Given the initial measure 0, the sequence of the measure of consumers ftg1
t=0 is consistent
with the demographic transition, the stochastic process of shocks, and the optimal decision
rules, after normalization with respect to population growth in each period t.
4. Government satises the period-by-period budget balance with respect to the Social Security






e(i;p) wt S dt (9)
85. Government satises the period-by-period budget constraint with respect to the estate tax








(1   si) g
a
t(i;p;a) dt (10)
Denition 2 (Steady-state recursive competitive equilibrium) A steady-state recursive
competitive equilibrium is a recursive competitive equilibrium where total factor productivity, bor-
rowing limits, type distribution, prices, government policy variables, aggregate capital stock and
labor supply, value functions, and optimal decision rules are constant over time, after normalizing
the type distribution of consumers by the population growth rate.
Notice that although I use the word steady state, the model is on a balanced growth path with a
constant population growth rate and the type distribution (after normalization) of heterogeneous
consumers is stationary. The measure of consumers is normalized to be a probability measure
(total measure is one) each period, which makes all the aggregate variables constant over time
instead of growing at the population growth rate.
2.9 Alternative Formulation of the Consumer's Problem with Hyperbolic Discount-
ing
I will provide an alternative formulation of the consumer's problem dened in Section 2.7, based
on the Strotz-Laibson hyperbolic discounting preferences. After showing the recursive formu-
lation of the consumer's problem, I will argue that the hyperbolic discounting preferences are
the special case of the temptation preferences; the resulting optimal decision rules are the same
as in the problem based on the preferences featuring temptation and self-control with  ! 1.
Finally, I discuss the dierence of the two specications in welfare implications.
For an age-i consumer, the expected lifetime utility, Ui, can be dened as follows:





According to the Strotz-Laibson set-up, in period t, instantaneous utility in period t, t+1, t+2,
t + 3,..., is discounted by 1, , 2,... Since  is used only to discount utility from the current
period and the next, while  is used to discount future utility every period,  and  are called
short-term and long-term discount factors, respectively. Notice that the standard exponential
discounting is a special case with  = 1: in this case, future utility is discounted exponentially
at the constant discount factor . The important feature of this class of preferences is that the
preferences exhibit time inconsistency; the discount factor applied between period t+1 and t+2
in period t is , while the discount factor between the same periods changes to  in period t+1.
With  2 (0;1), the preferences imply a present bias: if there is no constraint or commitment
device, consumers over-borrow and over-consume from the perspective in previous periods.
The problem of an age-i consumer with the current productivity shock p and asset position a
in period t can be characterized by the following Bellman equation:
e Vt(i;p;a) = max
a0at
"








9subject to the budget constraint (4). a0 = ga
t(i;p;a) is the optimal decision rule associated with
the Bellman equation above. Notice that the value function on the left-hand side, e Vt(i;p;a), is
dierent from the one on the right-hand side, which is Vt(i;p;a). The value function is updated
with the following equation:
Vt(i;p;a) =
"








where a0 = ga
t(i;p;a) and subject to (4).
Mechanically, the consumer chooses the optimal asset level a0 with the discounting factor
 but the actual value is evaluated with the discount factor .8 This is exactly the problem
described in Section 2.7 with  ! 1. In other words, the optimal decision rule ga
t(i;p;a)
obtained from (1) are equivalent to the optimal decision rule obtained from (12). Krusell et al.
(2010) formally prove the equivalence in the neoclassical growth model.9
Although the solution of the consumer's problem is the same between the formulation based on
the temptation preferences and on the hyperbolic discounting, there is an important dierence in
terms of how to conduct welfare analysis. In the case of the hyperbolic discounting preferences,
since the utility of the consumer changes over time, the same consumer at dierent point of
time are interpreted as dierent \selves," and the consumer's problem is understood as the
dynamic game among multiple selves. Under such circumstances, unless one uses Pareto criteria,
it is necessary to assign welfare weights to dierent selves to conduct welfare analysis. On the
other hand, the preferences featuring temptation and self-control, which is developed by Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001) and employed by Krusell et al. (2010), there is no time-inconsistency problem,
although their approach still allows to study preference reversals which leads to over-borrowing
and over-consuming. Since there is no multiple selves within a consumer, it is straightforward to
implement welfare analysis using their approach.
3 Calibration
This section describes how the steady-state model is calibrated.10 Consequently, the time script
t is dropped throughout the section. Each of the subsections below corresponds to those in
Section 2.
3.1 Demographics
One period is set as one year in the model. Age 1 in the model corresponds to the actual age of
20. I is set at 81, meaning that the maximum actual age is 100. IR is set at 45, implying that
consumers retire at the actual age of 65. The population growth rate, , is set at 1.2 percent
8 _ Imrohoro glu et al. (2003) distinguish the two cases in terms of what hyperbolic discounting consumers expect
about their own future decisions. According to their classication, a naive consumer wrongly thinks that
future selves make decisions in a time-consistent manner (using only the discount factor ). On the other
hand, a sophisticated consumer thinks that future selves are time-inconsistent (using both  and ). I use the
sophisticated consumers, as in Laibson (1996) and Laibson et al. (2007). Angeletos et al. (2001) nd that naive
and sophisticated hyperbolic discounting consumers behave similarly in a life-cycle model.
9 See Proposition 6.
10 More details can be found in the Supplementary Appendix.
10annually. This is the average annual population growth rate of the U.S. over the last 50 years.
The survival probabilities fsigI
i=1 are taken from the life table in Social Security Administration
(2007).11
3.2 Preferences
First of all, I assume  ! 1. As I discussed in Section 2.9, the assumption makes the temptation
model and the hyperbolic discounting model equivalent in terms of allocation. For the period





 is set at 1:5, which is the commonly used value. It is also the point estimate of Laibson et al.
(2007). Sensitivity of the main results with respect to the value of  is investigated in Section 7.
Discount factors  and  are calibrated to be dierent for dierent model economies, but the
calibration strategy is common. For all economies, I set the temptation discount factor  at rst
and calibrate the self-control discount factor  so that the capital-output ratio of the economy
in the baseline steady state is 3.0, which is the historical average value of the U.S. economy. In
other words, dierent model economies have dierent values of discount factors  and , but
they have the same aggregate capital stock in equilibrium.12
In the model without temptation,  = 1 by assumption. I found that with  = 0:9698 the
steady-state equilibrium of the model generates a capital-output ratio of 3.0. For the model with
temptation, I use  = 0:70 as the baseline value of the temptation discount factor and calibrate
. The temptation discount factor of 0:70 is the one-year discount factor typically obtained from
laboratory experiments.13 Moreover, the benchmark point estimate of Laibson et al. (2007) is
 = 0:703, or the annual discount rate of about 40 percent. The same calibration strategy
generates  = 0:9852. The calibrated value of  is higher than 0.958, which is the value that
Laibson et al. (2007) estimate jointly with . A large part of the dierence is due to the existence
of the mortality shock in the current model, which Laibson et al. (2007) do not have. If  is
adjusted by being multiplied by the average survival probability (0.9828), the resulting eective
 is 0.968. I also investigate the case when the discount rate is 80 percent annually, which is
twice as high as in the baseline temptation model. An 80 percent annual discount rate implies
a temptation discount factor  = 0:56. Using the same calibration strategy, the economy with
 = 0:56 yields  = 0:9930.
11 Table 4.C6 of Social Security Administration (2007). An average of the survival probabilities of males and
females is used.
12 Both Angeletos et al. (2001) and Tobacman (2009) calibrate  for the model without temptation (i.e., exponen-
tial discounting model) such that the average wealth holding at age 63 (the age just before retirement) is the
same as in the model with temptation (i.e., hyperbolic discounting model) where  and  are jointly estimated
from data. Since the life-cycle prole of asset holdings is similar in the two models, their strategy is similar to
the strategy adopted in this paper.
13 Although most existing literature estimate parameters with hyperbolic discounting model in mind, the model
is equivalent to the temptation model in terms allocation.
113.3 Technology
The following standard Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed:
Y = ZF(K;L) = ZK
L
1  (15)
Z is normalized such that, in the baseline steady state, the equilibrium wage is one. The
procedure implies Z = 0:896.  is set at 0:36, which corresponds to the average capital share of
income of the U.S. economy. The depreciation rate of capital is set at  = 0:06 per year. Huggett
(1996) calibrates  = 0:06 by matching the depreciation-output ratio of the model economy to
its U.S. counterpart.
3.4 Endowment
I assume the following multiplicative form of individual productivity.
e(i;p) = ei p (16)
ei represents the average age-earnings prole and p is the individual productivity shock. Since
retirement age is xed at IR, ei = 0 for i  IR. To calibrate feig
IR 1
i=1 , I follow Huggett (1996)
and use the data on the median earnings of male workers of dierent age groups from Social
Security Administration (2007).14 The median earnings data are multiplied by the employment
to population ratio of males in each age group. The employment to population ratio for each age
group is obtained from McGrattan and Rogerson (2004).15 Finally, the resulting age-productivity
prole is smoothed out by tting the age prole of the product of median earnings and the
employment to population ratio to a quadratic function of age. The resulting hump-shaped
earnings prole can be seen in Figure 2.
The stochastic process for p is calibrated by combining what I call the bottom 99%, whose
earnings dynamics are captured by the stochastic process of household earnings estimated from
the PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) and the top 1%, which represent the upper tail
of the earnings distribution and are added to replicate the substantial concentration of earnings
and wealth in the U.S.16 It is important that the model captures the observed concentration of
earnings and wealth, in order to make sure that the strength of the partial and general equilibrium
eects generated by the model is reasonable. As for the stochastic process associated with the
bottom 99%, I follow the literature and assume that the logarithm of p is initially drawn from a
normal distribution N(0;2
0) and follows an AR(1) process with the persistence parameter p and
the standard deviation of the innovation term . The triplet that characterizes the stochastic
process is calibrated to (p;2
0;2
) = (0:98;0:30;0:04). The choice is in the middle of estimates
in the literature. The persistence parameter p is estimated to be close to unity in the literature.
For example, Storesletten et al. (2004) obtained p = 0:9989, while Huggett (1996) calibrates
p = 0:96. The variance of initial earnings 2
0 ranges from 0.2735 in Storesletten et al. (2004) to
0.38 in Huggett (1996). 2
 is set so that the life-cycle prole of earnings variances replicates its
14 The earnings data are taken from Table 4.B6 of Social Security Administration (2007).
15 Table 3, 4, and 5 of McGrattan and Rogerson (2004).
16 See Budr a et al. (2002).
12empirical counterpart, for example, as shown in Storesletten et al. (2004). The AR(1) process
obtained above is approximated using the algorithm of Tauchen (1986).17
The top 1% is added since the PSID, which is used to estimate the stochastic process of
individual productivity shocks often used in the literature, is known to under-sample the top end
of the U.S. earnings distribution. The approach employed here corrects such shortcomings by
augmenting the estimated stochastic process of earnings with an additional state that captures
the top 1% of the earnings distribution. In other words, the approach here is a combination
of the literature that uses the estimated stochastic process to calibrate the earnings shock and
the literature that directly calibrates the earnings shock to capture the high concentration of
income and wealth independently from an empirically obtained stochastic process for earnings.18
Specically, the top 1% is characterized by an additional state of productivity shock, p1, which
is higher than the highest p of the bottom 99%. The parameters associated with the top 1% are
calibrated to satisfy the following: (i) initially 1% of consumers draw p1, (ii) the probability that
a bottom 99% consumer becomes a top 1% is set such that the proportion of the top 1% among
a cohort is always 1%, (iii) the probability of a top 1% remaining in the state is 0:92, (iv) when
a top 1% falls to the bottom 99%, the new p is drawn from the ergodic distribution of p among
the bottom 99%, (v) the level of p1 is calibrated such that the earnings Gini index of the baseline
steady state is 0.61.19 The probability of remaining a top 1% (0.92) is based on Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas (1995), which reports that 47.3 percent of households in the top 1% of income
distribution in 1979 remained in the top 1% in 1988.
3.5 Market Arrangements
In the baseline steady state, the borrowing limit a is set at zero, i.e., there is no borrowing. In
experiments, I will relax the borrowing limit to the extent such that the aggregate amount of
debt is the same between the model and the corresponding U.S. economy. In other words, I
will back out the degree of relaxation of the borrowing constraint from the observed increase in
indebtedness.
3.6 Government
The payroll tax rate for the Social Security contribution S is set at 0:10, which is the average
contribution to the Social Security program as a fraction of labor income in the U.S. The pro-
portional income tax rate of I = 0:2378 is set to match the U.S. historical average of the ratio
of total (federal, state, and local) government consumption over total income (0.195).
17 np = 17 abscissas are used. The abscissas are equally spaced between  p and p, where p is the standard
deviation of the ergodic distribution of p. Tauchen (1986) chooses  = 3 while Huggett (1996) uses  = 4. I set
 = 2:1 so that the life-cycle prole of earnings variances implied by the obtained Markov stochastic process
is close to the one implied by the original AR(1) process. In general, for a small np, properties of the Markov
process obtained using Tauchen's (1986) method vary with the choice of .
18 A leading example of the latter approach is Casta~ neda et al. (2003).
19 The earnings Gini is reported in Budr a et al. (2002).
134 Computation
Since there is no analytical solution to the model, the model is solved numerically.20 The space
of asset holdings is discretized, and the choice with respect to assets is also constrained by the
discretized state space. The equilibrium prices (wage and interest rate) and the government
policy variables (transfer and Social Security benets) are found using iteration.
5 Results: Steady-State Analysis
This section presents the main results, based on steady-state comparison. The starting point
of the analysis is the economy without debt (i.e., a = 0), which is calibrated in Section 3.
Since this economy mimics the U.S. economy in 1970 at which time unsecured consumer debt
was almost nonexistent, I call the economy the 1970 economy. Next, in order to replicate the
increased indebtedness between the 1970s and the 2000s with the model, I assume that the
increased indebtedness is due to a relaxed borrowing limit that consumers face. Relaxing the
borrowing limit is a parsimonious way to capture various types of innovation in the consumer
credit market that happened over the last three decades. The borrowing limit is calibrated such
that the aggregate debt is 7 percent of output in the steady state of the model. Since this level
of debt is observed in the U.S. economy in the 2000s, I call it the 2000 economy. I implement
this procedure separately for models with varying degree of temptation. The primary interest is
how dierent the macroeconomic implications are among the models.
Section 5.1 compares the 1970 economy with and without temptation. I show that the macroe-
conomic implications are very similar between the models. This observational similarity result
is the reconrmation of Angeletos et al. (2001). In Section 5.2, the macroeconomic implications
of increased indebtedness due to the relaxed borrowing limit are investigated, by comparing the
1970 economy and the 2000 economy. I will show that models with and without temptation
again exhibit similar responses to the relaxed borrowing limit. Section 5.3 analyzes the welfare
implications. The focus is on the dierence in the implications between models with and with-
out temptation. If, in addition, welfare implications of increased indebtedness are also similar
between the two models, there is no need to use the non-standard preferences for an analysis of
increased indebtedness. What I will show is that this is not the case: although the macroeco-
nomic implications are similar, the welfare implications are substantially dierent between the
models with and without temptation. Finally, in Section 5.4, I investigate the dierence in the
optimal borrowing limit among models varying degree of temptation.
5.1 Macroeconomic Implications: The 1970 Economy
Figure 2 compares the average life-cycle proles of the 1970 model economies without temptation
on the left and with temptation (with the temptation discount factor  = 0:70) on the right.
What is most striking is that there is little dierence between the two model economies in terms
of the average life-cycle prole. In both economies, the average consumption prole is smoother
than the income prole. Consumers save during the working period and dissave during the
retirement period. As a result, asset holdings increase until retirement age and decrease after
that in both models. Although the temptation model features the temptation discount factor
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Figure 2: Comparison between models with and without temptation: average life-
cycle proles
(), which, ceteris paribus, reduces savings and shifts consumption forward, when the model
with temptation is calibrated to generate the same capital-output ratio as in the model without
temptation, the self-control discount factor () is calibrated higher in the temptation model. As
a result, the eect of the temptation discount factor on the average life-cycle prole is negated.
The models with temptation and self-control exhibit a slightly higher concentration of wealth,
as more consumers are consuming all of their income and saving nothing. The wealth Gini
index is 0.786 for the model without temptation, while it is 0.806 for the temptation model with
 = 0:70. The wealth Gini for both economies is not far from 0.803, which is the wealth Gini of
the U.S. economy, reported by Budr a et al. (2002). For the temptation model with  = 0:56,
the wealth Gini index is 0.820. Tobacman (2009) also compares the wealth inequality implied
by the models with and without temptation. In the baseline case with both liquid and illiquid
assets, the model with temptation exhibits a Gini coecient of 0.508, which is slightly higher
than the value for the model without temptation (0.488). The magnitude of the dierence is
comparable to what is obtained here.
5.2 Macroeconomic Implications: Increased Indebtedness
Table 1 summarizes the macroeconomic implications of rising aggregate debt from 1970 to 2000.
The rst panel (the rst four rows) summarizes the results of the standard model without temp-
tation (i.e., exponential discounting model). The rst row in each panel shows the levels in the
1970 economy, without debt. The second row is associated with the 2000 steady-state economy.
Notice that the general equilibrium (GE) eect is taken into account when the new steady-state
equilibrium is obtained. The last row is capturing only the partial equilibrium (PE) eect; the
prices (interest rate and wage) are xed at the 1970 level, but the borrowing limit is relaxed to
the 2000 level. By comparing the second (GE) and the third (PE) rows, one can see the strength
of the general equilibrium eect in the steady-state economy. In the second panel, the baseline
temptation model ( = 0:70) is employed but the borrowing limit of the no-temptation model is
15Table 1: Macroeconomic eect of rising indebtedness
Economy1 GE2 a3 D/Y K4 Y4 C4 r% wage Var(c)5
No-temptation model ( = 1:00)
1970   0:000 0:000 1.000 1.000 1.000 6.00 1.000 0.592
2000 GE  0:570  0:070 0.957 0.984 0.991 6.34 0.984 0.580
2000 PE  0:570  0:082 0.914 0.968 0.991 6.00 1.000 0.562
Temptation model ( = 0:70) with a of no-temptation model
1970   0:000 0:000 1.000 1.000 1.000 6.00 1.000 0.588
2000 GE  0:570  0:085 0.958 0.986 0.990 6.33 0.985 0.577
2000 PE  0:570  0:098 0.915 0.969 0.990 6.00 1.000 0.562
Temptation model ( = 0:70)
1970   0:000 0:000 1.000 1.000 1.000 6.00 1.000 0.588
2000 GE  0:376  0:070 0.963 0.986 0.992 6.29 0.986 0.577
2000 PE  0:376  0:076 0.928 0.973 0.991 6.00 1.000 0.565
Temptation model ( = 0:56)
1970   0:000 0:000 1.000 1.000 1.000 5.98 1.000 0.594
2000 GE  0:297  0:070 0.964 0.987 0.992 6.26 0.988 0.589
2000 PE  0:297  0:074 0.934 0.976 0.991 5.98 1.000 0.580
1 1970: Economy with no borrowing. 2000: Economy calibrated to debt-to-output ratio
of 7 percent.
2 GE: general equilibrium. PE: partial equilibrium with prices xed at the 1970 level.
3 Borrowing limit relative to total income.
4 Level in the 1970 (no-debt) economy normalized to one.
5 Average of cross-sectional variances of consumption for all age groups.
applied. This panel is intended to highlight the dierence in the responses of the two economies
when the borrowing limit is relaxed to the same extent. The third panel is associated with the
baseline temptation model ( = 0:70). Notice that the borrowing limit a is calibrated to be
dierent from the no-temptation model, but the debt-to-output ratio, which is the calibration
target, is the same at 7 percent. In the last panel, results from the temptation model with a
lower temptation discount factor ( = 0:56), when the same calibration strategy as in the rst
and the third panels is employed, are shown.
As shown in second row of the rst panel, the borrowing limit of 57 percent of the average
income is needed to generate the aggregate amount of debt as large as 7 percent of output in
the model without temptation. In the 2000 economy, the equilibrium capital stock is 4.3 percent
lower than in the 1970 economy without borrowing. Since labor is inelastically supplied, the
decline in the capital stock generates a decline in output; output and aggregate consumption in
the 2000 economy are 1.6 and 0.9 percent lower than in the 1970 economy, respectively. The
equilibrium interest rate goes up from 6.00 percent in 1970 to 6.34 in 2000 as capital becomes
more scarce, and wage declines by 1.6 percent. Since a relaxed borrowing limit implies better
consumption smoothing, the cross-sectional consumption variance declines as the borrowing con-
16straint is relaxed: consumption variance drops from 0.592 in the 1970 economy to 0.580 in the
2000 economy.
What is the role of general equilibrium in shaping the macroeconomic implications discussed
above? By comparing the second and third rows, it is clear that, without the general equilibrium
eect, macroeconomic responses are stronger. In other words, the general equilibrium eect
partly attenuates the macroeconomic responses to the relaxed borrowing limit. Without the
general equilibrium eect, both capital stock and output decrease even more, debt increases
more, and the log-consumption inequality declines to a larger extent, too.
The second panel in Table 1 summarizes the results for the baseline temptation model ( =
0:70), but with the borrowing limit obtained for the no-temptation model (0.57 of average in-
come). Most changes are quite similar between the rst and second panels. But there is one
important dierence: the response of aggregate debt is stronger in the temptation model. When
the borrowing limit is relaxed such that debt increased by 7 percent of output in the model with-
out temptation, the aggregate debt over output ratio increased by 8.5 percent in the temptation
model.
In the third panel, I implement the same procedure as in the rst panel for the baseline
temptation model ( = 0:70). Since the response of aggregate debt to a relaxed borrowing limit
is stronger in the temptation model, the borrowing limit that generates the aggregate debt of 7
percent of output is more strict than in the no-temptation model. Indeed, the borrowing limit is
calibrated to be 37.6 percent of the average income in the temptation model. The macroeconomic
responses to a relaxed borrowing limit in the temptation are only slightly weaker than in the no-
temptation model. Capital stock, output, and consumption decline by 3.7, 1.4, and 0.8 percent,
respectively, in the temptation model, while the drops are 4.3, 1.6, and 0.9 percent in the no-
temptation model. Cross-sectional consumption variances decline by 1.1 percentage points in the
temptation model, compared to a 1.2 percentage point decline in the model without temptation.
As in the no-temptation model, the general equilibrium eect partly osets the macroeconomic
responses to the relaxed borrowing limit.
Figure 3 compares the 1970 (no borrowing) and 2000 (7 percent debt-to-output ratio) economies
with and without temptation. The left panel corresponds to the no-temptation model, and the
right panel is associated with the temptation model. Each panel shows how the average life-cycle
proles of consumption and asset holdings react when the borrowing limit is relaxed. The main
nding is that the response between the two models is almost indistinguishable.
The last panel in Table 1 summarizes the macroeconomic implications of an increased indebt-
edness for the temptation model with a lower temptation discount factor ( = 0:56). As in the
case for the baseline temptation model ( = 0:70), the borrowing limits are calibrated so that
the amount of aggregate debt is 7 percent of output in the new steady state. As the column
labeled a shows, the borrowing limit has to be even tighter (29.7 percent) than in the baseline
temptation model (37.6 percent) because of the stronger response of debt to a relaxation of the
borrowing constraint. The size of the response of macroeconomic aggregates is slightly weaker
than in the temptation model with a higher (lower) discount factor (rate). For example, capital
stock, output, and consumption decline by 3.6, 1.3, and 0.8 percent, respectively, in the model
with  = 0:56, while the drops are 3.7, 1.4, and 0.8 percent in the baseline temptation model
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Figure 3: Comparison between models with and without temptation: response of
consumption (left axis) and asset holdings (right axis) to a relaxed borrowing limit
5.3 Welfare Implications: Increased Indebtedness
In this section, I will investigate the welfare implications of a relaxed borrowing limit. Before
starting the analysis, an issues related to the welfare analysis in the current environment need
to be addressed. Since the model used here features a heterogeneous agent model with life-cycle
and uninsured idiosyncratic shocks, there is no obvious way to dene social welfare. I investigate
social welfare in multiple ways. First, I use the ex-ante expected lifetime utility in the steady-
state equilibrium as social welfare. The virtue of this welfare criterion is that this naturally takes
into account both the welfare gain or loss from changes in aggregate consumption (eciency
eect) and the welfare gain or loss due to changes in the degree of insurance (insurance eect).
For this reason, the social welfare function is widely used together with incomplete market models
with nitely lived consumers; for example, Conesa et al. (2009) use it to investigate the optimal






p V (1;p;0) (17)
where V (:) is dened as in equation (1).
Second, I also look at cross-sectional welfare implications. Because of the rich heterogeneity
of the model, it is also important to look at the heterogeneity of the welfare eect for dier-
ent types of consumers. To that end, I also investigate the expected lifetime utility in the
steady-state equilibrium for consumers with dierent initial productivity p. Since the produc-
tivity shock is highly persistent, looking at the welfare implications for consumers with dierent
initial p roughly corresponds to studying the heterogeneous eects on consumers with dierent
productivity potentials.
Finally, in Section 6, I will investigate the welfare eect associated with the rising indebted-
ness taking the equilibrium transition path into account. The analysis enables us to study the
heterogeneous welfare eect on consumers in dierent cohorts along the transition path.
18Table 2: Welfare implications of rising indebtedness
Welfare gain1
Initial productivity3
GE2 EV Low Medium High
No-temptation model ( = 1:00)
PE +2:69 +6:63 +2:50 +0:16
GE +0:65 +3:02 +0:52 +0:31
Temptation model ( = 0:70)
PE +0:61 +1:88 +0:18 +0:13
GE  0:39 +0:44  0:31 +0:96
Temptation model ( = 0:56)
PE  0:46 +0:81  0:43  0:61
GE  1:09  0:67  1:13 +1:60
1 Measured by the percentage increase in per-period consumption at all ages and
states associated with the move from the 1970 steady-state economy (without debt)
to the 2000 economy (with debt-to-output ratio of 7 percent).
2 GE: general equilibrium. PE: partial equilibrium with prices xed at the 1970 level.
3 Low: consumers with the lowest initial p. Medium: consumers with the median
initial p. High: consumers with highest initial p.
Notice that the important consideration in the current paper is the welfare loss due to the
relaxed borrowing constraint and induced over-consumption. The preferences featuring tempta-
tion and self-control capture such a welfare loss naturally, because consumers succumb to the
temptation of choosing consumption by discounting future value by , while the actual value is
based on the discount factor . In other words, consumers choose consumption (savings) that is
higher (lower) than the level associated with the highest welfare. The over-consumption (under-
saving) problem is substantial. For example, if consumers have perfect self-control in the model
with  = 0:70, consumers make consumption-savings decisions based only on  and the resulting
capital-output ratio in the steady state is 22.5 percent higher than in the baseline temptation
model.
Table 2 summarizes the welfare implications of rising indebtedness in the models with and
without temptation. The three panels correspond to the no-temptation model, the baseline
temptation model with  = 0:70, and the temptation model with a lower temptation discount
factor  = 0:56. For each model, two cases are shown. GE denotes the case where the 2000
economy, which is a steady-state equilibrium, is compared to the 1970 economy. PE denotes to
the case where the prices are xed at the 1970 levels, but the borrowing limit of the 2000 economy
is used. The column marked as EV in Table 2 shows the changes in social welfare associated
with the increased indebtedness, induced by a relaxed borrowing limit, expressed as a percentage
change in per-period consumption. The comparison between the no-temptation model (the rst





















Productivity: 1 (low) - 18 (high)
No-temptation model (GE)
No-temptation model (PE)
Figure 4: Heterogeneity of welfare gain: Partial and general equilibrium
of a relaxed borrowing limit are very dierent, although, as shown in the previous section, the
macroeconomic implications are similar. In the case where the prices are xed at 1970 levels
(partial equilibrium, or PE in the table), while the no-temptation model implies a welfare gain
of 2.7 percent by moving from the 1970 economy (no borrowing) to the 2000 economy (with a
debt-to-output ratio of 7 percent), the temptation model implies a substantially smaller welfare
gain of 0.6 percent. The model with a higher degree of temptation (the third panel) implies a
welfare loss of 0.5 percent. The general equilibrium eect osets part of the gain or increases
the loss, through lower output associated with lower capital stock. If the general equilibrium
eect is taken into account, while the no-temptation model implies a welfare gain of 0.7 percent,
the baseline temptation model implies a welfare loss of 0.4 percent. The temptation model with
 = 0:56 implies an even larger welfare loss of 1.1 percent.
Figure 4 compares the heterogeneous welfare eects with and without a general equilibrium
eect in the model without temptation. In the gure, each line represents the welfare gain
of moving from the 1970 economy to the 2000 economy for consumers with dierent initial
productivity p (1 is the lowest and 18 is the highest). The last three columns of Table 2 present
welfare gains of consumers with low, medium, and high productivity initially. With respect to the
welfare eects on consumers with dierent productivity potentials, three groups with dierent
initial productivity are aected dierently in the model without temptation. First, those with
initial low productivity benet most from the relaxed borrowing limit. The consumers with
the lowest initial productivity gain as much as 6.6 percent of per-period consumption in the
partial equilibrium case, and 3.0 percent with the general equilibrium eects considered. This is
because the likelihood that they are constrained by the borrowing limit is highest for this group
of consumers. However, they experience a welfare loss from the general equilibrium eect. In
Figure 4, the line representing the welfare eect with the general equilibrium eect considered,
is located below the line representing the welfare eect without the general equilibrium eect,
for consumers with low initial productivity. The reason is a lower equilibrium wage and a higher
equilibrium interest rate, caused by a lower capital stock. Since the low-productivity consumers
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Figure 5: Heterogeneity of welfare gain: Models with and without temptation
eects hit the consumers negatively.
Second, the group with high initial productivity does not gain much from the relaxed borrow-
ing limit. For those with the highest initial productivity in the no-temptation model, the welfare
gain without the general equilibrium eect is a mere 0.2 percent increase in per-period consump-
tion. Since it is not likely that they are constrained by the borrowing limit, they do not gain
much from a relaxed borrowing limit. However, they gain from the general equilibrium eect.
This is because they most likely remain savers throughout their lives, and they benet from a
higher interest rate, although part of the gain is oset by a lower wage. The welfare gain with the
general equilibrium eect is equivalent to a 0.3 percent increase in per-period consumption. This
contrasting general equilibrium eect for high and low productivity consumers is exactly what
Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) emphasize in a dierent but closely related environment. In
the model by Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) with secured credit, high discount rate consumers
who remain borrowers lose from the general equilibrium eect, and low discount rate consumers
gain from the general equilibrium eect. In their setup, the general equilibrium eect is strong
enough to incur a welfare loss for consumers with low initial productivity (in their case, high
discount rate consumers), but the eect is not strong enough to overturn the welfare gain from
the partial equilibrium eect here.
Finally, interestingly, consumers with medium initial productivity either enjoy a small welfare
gain or suer a welfare loss from the relaxed borrowing limit. In Figure 4, consumers with initial
productivity of 12-17 in the no-temptation model suer by moving from the 1970 economy to
the 2000 economy. This is due to the combination of the weak welfare gain from the relaxed
borrowing limit and the stronger negative welfare loss from a lower wage and a higher interest
rate. As a result, the solid line in Figure 4, which represents the welfare eect for heterogeneous
consumers, exhibits a U-shape. This is the same property that Obiols-Homs (2011) found in a
similar environment.
Figure 5 compares the heterogeneity of welfare eects across consumers with dierent initial
productivity in the models with and without temptation. The general equilibrium eects are

























Figure 6: Level of borrowing limit and social welfare
with dierent levels of initial productivity. Although the U-shape is also observed in the model
with temptation in Figure 5, there are signicant dierences. The dierence is especially striking
for consumers with low initial productivity. Their gain from having a relaxed borrowing limit is
signicantly smaller in the case of the baseline temptation model. The key reason is the negative
welfare eect of over-borrowing. Those who are close to the borrowing limit benet from having
a less strict borrowing limit, which facilitates consumption smoothing across age and states, but
suer from borrowing more than the level associated with the highest utility.
5.4 Optimal Borrowing Limit with Temptation
The discussion in the previous section implies that the optimal level of the borrowing limit diers,
potentially substantially, across models with varying degree of temptation. Here I dene optimal
as the level of the uniform borrowing limit that is associated with the highest social welfare
dened as the ex-ante expected lifetime utility. Figure 6 exhibits social welfare, expressed as the
increase in per-period consumption over the initial steady-state economy without debt, under
dierent levels of the borrowing limit in the models with varying degree of temptation. The
general equilibrium eect is taken into account. Three things are worth pointing out. First,
the line for the model without temptation is located above the other lines, which are associated
with the temptation models; the welfare gain is always higher in the no-temptation model,
conditional on the same level of the borrowing limit. Second, all lines are hump shaped, because
the negative general equilibrium eect from a lower capital stock dominates at some point for
all economies, as the borrowing limit becomes relaxed. Third, the optimal level of the borrowing
limit, which is associated with the highest point of each line in Figure 6, is decreasing in the
degree of temptation. This is mainly because preferences featuring temptation and self-control
imply a smaller (or negative) welfare gain from the relaxed borrowing limit for low and medium
productivity consumers.
For the no-temptation model, the level of the uniform borrowing limit that maximizes social
welfare is 19 percent of average income. This optimal level is lower than the level calibrated
for the 2000 economy (57 percent). In other words, the model without temptation implies that
22the borrowing limit is too lax in the 2000 U.S. economy. At the optimal borrowing limit, the
social welfare gain is 1.25 percent, which is close to the double of the welfare gain in the 2000
economy (0.65 percent). Cross-sectionally, consumers with the lowest initial productivity gain by
3.5 percent instead of 3.0 percent in terms of ow consumption if the economy is at the optimal
borrowing limit instead of the 2000 economy. Consumers with medium productivity gain by
1.1 percent instead of 0.5 percent. On the other hand, the gain enjoyed by consumers with the
highest productivity declines from 0.3 percent to 0.2 percent. In the baseline temptation model
( = 0:70), the optimal borrowing limit is 7 percent of average income. This optimal level is
substantially lower than in the no-temptation model (19 percent) because of the welfare loss from
over-borrowing. Furthermore, as in the no-temptation model, the optimal level is substantially
lower than 37.6 percent, which is the borrowing limit corresponding to the 2000 economy. Indeed,
the social welfare gain is positive (0.39 percent) if the optimal borrowing limit is implemented,
compared to the welfare loss of 0.39 percent in the 2000 economy. In the case of the temptation
model with a lower temptation discount factor ( = 0:56), the optimal borrowing limit declines
further to 6 percent of average income. The social welfare gain is again positive (0.26 percent),
compared to the 1.1 percent welfare loss in the 2000 economy.
In sum, when the general equilibrium eect is strong and causes social welfare to decline,
implementing a tighter borrowing limit generates a welfare gain, in economies both with and
without temptation. The dierence between the models with and without temptation is that
social welfare starts to decline with a relatively low level of the borrowing limit in the temptation
model, due to the over-consuming induced by the relaxed borrowing limit. Therefore, just as
commitment by using an illiquid asset is valued in Laibson (1997) and forced saving might be
welfare-improving in Malin (2008), tightening the borrowing limit in the temptation model can
improve welfare as the tight borrowing limit prevents consumers from over-consuming, in addition
to limiting the general equilibrium eect.
6 Results: Transition Analysis
This section presents the results of the analysis with the equilibrium transition path. In con-
structing the transition path between the initial steady state and the nal one, I assume that the
initial steady state is characterized by no borrowing (a = 0). The initial steady state corresponds
to the 1970 economy in Section 5. The nal steady state is characterized by the borrowing limit
associated with a debt-to-output ratio of 7 percent. This state corresponds to the 2000 economy
in the previous section. Notice that the borrowing limit in the nal steady state is dierent
depending on the model, but all models generate the observed amount of debt in the 2000s. I
assume that the borrowing limit relaxes linearly between period 0 (corresponds to 1970) and
period 30 (corresponds to 2000).21 After period 30, the borrowing limit stays at the level in the
2000 economy, while the economy converges to the 2000 steady state. In what follows, I rst
present the transition path of macroeconomic aggregates generated by the models (Section 6.1).
The welfare analysis that explicitly takes into account the transition to the new steady state
21 An alternative assumption is to let the borrowing limit jump to the level in the 2000 economy from the beginning
of the transition (1971). However, it turns out that this alternative scenario generates a counterfactual transition
path of the debt-to-output ratio: the debt-to-output ratio increases immediately in the 1970s, while the debt-
to-output ratio gradually increases in the U.S. economy (Figure 1).
23follows (Section 6.2).22
6.1 Macroeconomic Aggregates
Figure 7 compares the macroeconomic aggregates between 1970 and 2010, for the models with
and without temptation. The results with the no-temptation model are on the left side, while
those of the baseline temptation model ( = 0:70) are on the right side of the gure. Panels
(a) and (b) compare the path of the debt-to-output ratio of the models and of the data (same
as in Figure 1). It is clear that both models capture the dynamics of the debt-to-output ratio
in the data quite well. In both models, the debt-to-output ratio gradually increases from the
initial level of zero in 1970 and reaches about 7 percent around 2000. Panels (c) and (d) compare
the transition path of the capital stock and output. Although there are some non-monotonic
dynamics in the model with temptation, the long-run trend is the decline in the capital stock
over time, as consumers borrow more or save less over time. As a result, output also continues to
decrease over time. This is the source of the negative general equilibrium eect on welfare. Since
labor is supplied inelastically, a declining capital stock yields a declining trend of wage and the
increasing trend of the interest rate in the economy. These trends are present in both models, as
shown in panels (e) and (f).
6.2 Welfare Implications
Similarly to what is shown in Section 5 using steady-state comparison, welfare implications
are strikingly dierent between models with and without temptation along the transition path,
although the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates are similar. Figure 8 compares the welfare
implications along the transition path in two models. Figures for the no-temptation model are
on the left while those for the temptation model are on the right. First, panels (a) and (b)
compare the ex-ante expected lifetime utility of newborns (age-20 consumers) in dierent years
along the transition path. Welfare is measured as the uniform increase in per-period consumption
against the initial steady state. For example, in panel (a), the welfare gain is approximately 0.65
percent in 2000; this means that an age-20 consumer in 2000 along the transition path is better
o than if he had been born in 1970 (the initial steady state), by an increase in per-period
consumption equivalent to 0.65 percent. Two things can be learned from comparing panels (a)
and (b). First, the welfare gain from a relaxed borrowing limit is substantially higher in the model
without temptation throughout the transition path. Second, while the welfare eect is positive
throughout the transition path in the no-temptation model, the welfare eect is negative for all
generations in the temptation model. Third, in the model without temptation, the welfare eect
is non-monotone; consumers born after 1975 are worse o than those born in 1975 as the general
equilibrium eect associated with the decumulating capital stock intensies along the transition
path. However, the negative general equilibrium eect is quantitatively small compared with the
large gain during the transition between 1970 and 2000 in the no-temptation model.
Panels (c) and (d) exhibit the heterogeneity of the welfare eects on newborns (age-20 con-
sumers) with dierent initial productivity levels along the transition path in the models with
and without temptation. The dierence is striking. Consumers with initial low productivity
gain substantially less in the temptation model. Whereas low-productivity consumers gain by

















































































































































































































(d) Temptation: heterogeneity of welfare
Figure 8: Comparison of welfare eects along the transition path
3-4 percent in the no-temptation model, the welfare gain is about 0.5 percent in the temptation
model. In the temptation model, the relaxed borrowing constraint induces both a welfare gain
(better consumption smoothing) and a welfare loss (over-consuming). Consumers with initial
medium productivity, who basically determine the average welfare gain or loss of the cohorts,
gain by about 1 percent in the model without temptation, while they suer a welfare loss through-
out the transition path in the temptation model. Indeed, those who gain the most along the
transition path in the temptation model are the high-productivity consumers who gain mainly
from the general equilibrium eect.
In Figure 9, the proportion of consumers who gain from the transition to the 2000 economy
among each age group in 1970 is shown, for both the model without temptation (panel (a)) and
the temptation model (panel (b)). We can see that a very large proportion of consumers in
1970 gain from the switch to the transition path in the model without temptation. In total, 89
percent of consumers in 1970 (initial steady state) gain from the switch. On the other hand, in
the temptation model, many consumers, especially the young ones, suer from the transition. In










































































(b) Temptation: proportion with welfare gain
Figure 9: Comparison of welfare eects on the initial consumers
In sum, the transition analysis conrms the ndings of the steady-state comparison: although
the macroeconomic implications are similar between the models with dierent preference assump-
tions, the welfare implications are strikingly dierent if the welfare loss from over-borrowing is
taken into account in the model with temptation and self-control. The ex-ante expected lifetime
utility of newborns quickly rises above 1 percent (measured by per-period consumption growth)
and slowly stabilizes at around 0.65 percent in 2000 in the no-temptation model, while the welfare
measures stays negative and stabilizes at  0:4 percent in 2000 in the temptation model.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
This section provides sensitivity analysis with respect to the risk aversion parameter  and
endogenous labor supply. First, I implement the same steady-state analysis as in Section 5 with
 = 3:0 instead of the baseline value of  = 1:5. The results are summarized in the top two panels
of Table 3. As in the baseline experiments, the temptation model requires a more strict borrowing
limit (47 percent of average income) than in the model without temptation (61 percent). As in
the baseline experiments, the macroeconomic implications of moving from the 1970 economy to
the 2000 economy are similar across the models with and without temptation. On the other
hand, the welfare gain of relaxing the borrowing limit is very dierent; it is equivalent to a
5.1 percent increase in ow consumption in the no-temptation model, while it is a 2.3 percent
increase in the temptation model. Although both economies imply a social welfare gain from the
relaxed borrowing limit as the gain from better consumption smoothing is larger with a higher
risk aversion, the size of the welfare gain is very dierent between the two economies.
The bottom two panels of Table 3 summarize the macroeconomic and welfare implications us-
ing the models with labor-leisure decisions. I assume the following non-separable utility function
between consumption and leisure.




I follow the same calibration strategy as for the baseline experiments, except for . I calibrate
27Table 3: Macroeconomic and welfare implications: sensitivity analysis
Economy1 GE2 a3 D/Y K4 Y4 r% Var(c)5 EV 6
 = 3:0, no-temptation model
1970   0:000 0:000 1.000 1.000 6.00 0.575  
2000 PE  0:610  0:079 0.917 0.969 6.00 0.548 +9:17
2000 GE  0:610  0:070 0.937 0.977 6.51 0.569 +5:31
 = 3:0, temptation model
1970   0:000 0:000 1.000 1.000 6.00 0.571  
2000 PE  0:470  0:079 0.924 0.972 6.00 0.547 +5:30
2000 GE  0:470  0:070 0.940 0.978 6.49 0.566 +2:34
Endogenous labor, no-temptation model
1970   0:000 0:000 1.000 1.000 6.00 0.472  
2000 PE  1:014  0:077 0.928 0.972 6.00 0.470 +1:08
2000 GE  1:014  0:070 0.968 0.987 6.24 0.480  1:31
Endogenous labor, temptation model
1970   0:000 0:000 1.000 1.000 6.00 0.474  
2000 PE  0:815  0:073 0.956 0.982 6.00 0.473 +0:52
2000 GE  0:815  0:070 0.977 0.991 6.16 0.480  1:00
1 1970: Economy with no borrowing. 2000: Economy calibrated to debt-to-output ratio
of 7 percent.
2 GE: general equilibrium. PE: partial equilibrium with prices xed at the 1970 level.
3 Borrowing limit relative to total income.
4 Level in the 1970 (no-debt) economy normalized to one.
5 Average of cross-sectional variances of consumption for all age groups.
6 Change in social welfare from the 1970 economy, measured as the percentage change
in per-period consumption.
 such that the average time spent working is 33 percent of the disposable time (which is one).
As for the partial equilibrium eect, as in the baseline results, the temptation model implies
a lower welfare gain from the relaxed borrowing limit (equivalent to per-period consumption
growth of 0.5 percent) than the model without temptation (1.1 percent). However, if the gen-
eral equilibrium eect is taken into account, both models imply a welfare loss associated with
increased indebtedness, and the loss is larger for the no-temptation model. Why? As studied
by Pijoan-Mas (2006), when consumers can use labor-leisure decisions, consumers can smooth
consumption substantially through this channel. Therefore, the borrowing constraint is less im-
portant for consumption smoothing. This can be seen as the relatively small welfare gain in the
partial equilibrium experiments. On the other hand, a weaker need for consumption smoothing
means that the borrowing limit must be relaxed substantially to generate a debt-to-output ratio
of 7 percent. Notice that the calibrated borrowing limits for the 2000 economies are very high
for both models in Table 3. Besides, as in the baseline case, the no-temptation model implies a
more lax borrowing limit. Under these circumstances, the stronger negative general equilibrium
28eect in the model without temptation dominates for the total welfare eect. This experiment
implies that the endogenous labor supply decision, and the consumption smoothing due to it, is
crucially important in determining the welfare implications of a relaxed borrowing limit.
8 Conclusion
This paper investigates the macroeconomic and welfare implications of rising indebtedness in the
U.S. using the model with preferences featuring temptation and self-control. The temptation
model can capture the welfare loss associated with of over-borrowing, together with the gain
from better consumption smoothing and the general equilibrium eects. There are three main
ndings. First, not only are the models with and without temptation observationally similar in
terms of macroeconomic aggregates in the steady state, but they also have similar predictions in
terms of macroeconomic changes in response to a relaxed borrowing limit. Second, although the
macroeconomic implications of the relaxed borrowing limit are similar between the two models,
the welfare implications are very dierent; the temptation models imply signicantly lower or
even negative welfare eects associated with rising indebtedness. In particular, I nd that when
debt increases to the same extent as in the period 1970-2000, there is a loss of social welfare
equivalent to a 0.39 percent decrease in per-period consumption in the temptation model. On
the other hand, the standard model without temptation implies a welfare gain equivalent to a
0.65 percent increase in per-period consumption. Finally, the optimal borrowing limit becomes
lower when the degree of temptation becomes higher. A tight restriction on borrowing could be
welfare-improving according to the temptation model, not only because it restricts the negative
general equilibrium eect, but also it helps consumers avoiding over-borrowing.
Even though the models with and without temptation are observationally similar along many
dimensions, they have very dierent welfare implications. Therefore, from the normative per-
spective, it is important to nd other and better ways to distinguish between the two models,
although there is little need to use the non-standard preferences from the positive perspective.
I list two potential ways to distinguish. First, if we can observe the borrowing constraint, con-
sumers' response to changes in the borrowing constraint can be used to identify the degree of
temptation. It would be even more helpful if the borrowing constraint for individual consumers
can be observed. Second, it might be possible to combine the model implications and survey
data to distinguish between the two models, if the survey data can be mapped into welfare
implications. This issue is left for future research.
One interesting and important extension from the current paper is associated with consumer
bankruptcy. The increase in consumer debt has been accompanied by a substantial increase in
consumer bankruptcy lings. White (2007) argues that a high level of consumer bankruptcies
can be better understood using hyperbolic discounting/temptation preferences. Recently, the
consumer bankruptcy law was reformed to make bankruptcy more costly and not available to
consumers with relatively high incomes in order to discourage abuse of the law. The standard
equilibrium models of consumer bankruptcy imply that a tougher bankruptcy law might benet
consumers by allowing a stronger commitment to repay. But it is not clear if the intuition carries
over when consumers suer from over-borrowing. Nakajima (2009) investigates this issue.
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Figure 12: Average life-cycle prole of
labor productivity
Figure 10 shows the survival probabilities conditional on age. This is used as fsigI
i=1 in the
calibration. Figure 11 compares the discount factors of the standard exponential discounting and
hyperbolic discounting models for periods (years) 1 to 50. The calibrated  and  are used. The
gure shows that the discount factor function drops substantially more from period 1 to 2 in the
case of the hyperbolic discounting preferences. On the other hand, the discount factor applied
to utility in the distant future is higher for the hyperbolic discounting model. Laibson (1997)
argues that housing, from which inhabitants can enjoy utility as long as they own it and live in
it, has an extra value for hyperbolic discounting consumers, since the dividends can be enjoyed
for a long period of time. Figure 12 shows the average life-cycle prole of the labor productivity.
This is used as feigI
i=1 in the calibration.
33Appendix B: Computation Algorithm
I will rst describe below the computational algorithm to solve the steady-state equilibrium
of the model with temptation. Since the focus is the steady-state equilibrium, I drop the time
script in the algorithm. The solution method for the model without temptation (i.e., exponential
discounting model) is straightforward. Adding the labor-leisure decision is also straightforward.
Algorithm 1 (Computation algorithm for solving steady-state equilibrium)
1. Set the initial guess of the aggregate capital K0 and per-consumer transfer d0. Notice that
aggregate labor supply L can be computed independently from the model since there is no
labor supply decision.
2. Given K0 and L, compute the interest rate r and the wage w. The transfer used in the
iteration is equal to the guess, i.e., d = d0. The Social Security benet b can be computed
given w and the age distribution, which is exogenous to the model. Once b is obtained,
fbigI
i=1 can be set as bi = b for i  IR and bi = 0 for i < IR.
3. Given fr;w;d;big, solve the consumer's optimization problem using backward induction.
(a) Set V (I + 1;p;a) = 0 for all p and a.
(b) Solve the problem of the consumer of age-I, using the Bellman equation (1) for all p
and a. The optimal level a0 is obtained by basically comparing values conditional on
a0 and choosing a0 associated with the highest value. Notice that, since  ! 1, the
optimal a0 is chosen to maximize the temptation utility, while the value function is
updated using self-control utility.
(c) With V (I;p;a) at hand, we can solve the problem of age-I  1 consumers. Keep going
back in the same way until the value function and the optimal decision rule for age 1
(initial age) consumers are obtained.
4. Using the obtained optimal decision rule ga(i;p;a), simulate the model.
(a) Set the type distribution for the newborns, which is exogenously given. In particular,
all newborns have i = 1 and a = 0. Initial p is distributed according to 0
p.
(b) Update the type distribution using the stochastic process for p and the optimal decision
rule ga(I;p;a).
(c) Keep updating until age I (last age).
5. Compute the aggregate capital stock K1 and total amount of accidental bequests implied by
the simulated distribution. Notice that consumers survive according to the survival probabil-
ity, and there is population growth, which makes the size of the younger population larger.
Make these adjustments when computing the aggregate capital stock and accidental bequests.
34Specically, when the measure of age 1 consumers is normalized to one, measures of age-i







where s0 = 1. Once the aggregate amount of accidental bequests is computed, we can
compute the per-consumer lump-sum transfer d1.
6. Compare fK0;d0g and fK1;d1g. If they are closer than a predetermined tolerance level,
stop. Otherwise, update fK0;d0g and go back to step 2.
Next, I will describe the solution algorithm of an equilibrium that features the deterministic
transition between two steady states. The rst step is to obtain the two steady states using the
Algorithm 1. Denote the initial and the new steady state by t = 0 and t = 1, respectively. Set
the initial distribution along the transition path 0 as the type distribution of consumers in the
initial steady state, and the value at the end of the transition V1(i;p;a) as the value function
in the new steady state. The only dierence between the two steady states is the borrowing
limit a; total factor productivity Z is assumed to be constant over time. I also assume that
the transition is complete after T < 1 periods. Since the model economy converges to the new
steady state only asymptotically, a large T is desirable for a good approximation. Now, in period
0 the economy is in the initial steady state, but in period 1, the transition, in particular the
sequence of the borrowing limit fatgT
t=0, is revealed to consumers. Let a1 = a0 = 0 and at = a1
for t = e T; e T + 1; e T + 2;:::;T, and at gradually increases between period 1 and period e T < T. I
set e T = 30. Since t = 0 corresponds to 1970 (initial steady state without borrowing) and one
period is a year, t = e T = 30 corresponds to 2000. After 2000, the borrowing limit is assumed to
remain at the same level as in 2000.
Algorithm 2 (Computation algorithm for solving equilibrium transition path)
1. Set the initial guess of sequences fK0
t ;d0
tgT
t=0. Notice that aggregate labor supply fLtgT
t=0




t=0, compute the sequence frt;wt;dt;bt;igT
t=0.
3. Given frt;wt;dt;bt;igT
t=0, solve the consumer's optimization problem using backward induc-
tion.
(a) Start from period T. Notice that we know the value function VT+1(i;p;a) = V1(i;p;a)
for 8(i;p;a) since the economy is assumed to have converged to the new steady state
in period T.
(b) Solve the consumer's problem for 8(i;p;a) in period T, given VT+1(i;p;a). The solu-
tion method for the model with temptation is the same as in the steady-state equilibrium
described in Algorithm 1. The optimal decision rule ga
T(i;p;a) and the value function
VT(i;p;a) are obtained. Notice that since the value function for the next period is
given, there is no need to go back from age I as in Algorithm 1.
35(c) Keep going back until t = 0.
4. Using the obtained optimal decision rule ga
t(i;p;a), simulate the model.
(a) The type distribution in period 0 is given by 0.
(b) Update the type distribution using the stochastic process for p and the optimal decision
rule ga
t(i;p;a). Make sure to normalize the population size each period.




t=0 using the sequence of distribution ftgT







t=0. If they are closer than a predetermined tolerance
level, stop. Otherwise, update fK0
t ;d0
tgT
t=0 and go back to step 2.
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